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## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION

Plaintiff,  Note the reasons stated by the parties on the record on Jawas 1 21, 2015, the Court excludes time under the Speedy Trial Act from Jawas 2, 2015 to February 17, 2015 and finds that the ends of justice serve by the continuance outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. See 18 U.S.C. § 161(h)(7)(A). The Court makes this finding and bases this continuance on the following factor(s):  Failure to grant a continuance would be likely to result in a miscarriage of justice.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(B)(i).  The case is so unusual or so complex, due to [check applicable reasons] the number of defendants, the nature of the prosecution, or the existence of novel questions of factor law, that it is unreasonable to expect adequate preparation for pretrial proceedings or the trial itself within the time limits established by this section. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(B)(ii).  Failure to grant a continuance would deny the defendant reasonable time to obtain counsel, taking into account the exercise of due diligence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(B)(ii).  Failure to grant a continuance would unreasonably deny the defendant continuity of counsel, give counsel's other scheduled case commitments, taking into account the exercise of due diligence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(B)(iv).  Failure to grant a continuance would unreasonably deny the defendant the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(B)(iv).  Analysis of the factor of the factor of the prosecution of the factor of the defendant the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(B)(iv).  Analysis of the factor of the factor of the factor of the defendant the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(B)(iv).  Analysis of the factor of the factor of the fact	United States of Am	erica,	) C	ase No. CR	15	041	CRB		
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STIPULATED:  Attorney for Defendant (F. SMITH)  ATTORNEY FOR DEF (A. JONES)  ATTORNEY FOR DEF (F. TERRY)	necessary for	r effective preparation,							
Attorney for Def (A. Jones)	IT IS SO ORDERI	ED			Л	<i>( )</i>	1		
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Attorney for Defendant (# Sustan) Assistant United States Attorney  Attorney For Def (A. Jones) ATTORNEY FOR DEF (P. 1ERRY)  ATTORNEY FOR DEF (A. JONES) ATTORNEY FOR DEF (P. 1ERRY)		- AR1 1	J						
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ATTORNEY FOR DEF (T. SMITH) ATTORNEY FOR DEF (A. JACKSON)	Ĉ	TOYAL ( )	TONES	ATTORNE	Y FOR	DEF (	P. TERRY	5	
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